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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

A.

Bill Clark brings his appeal from the District Court decision
of the Honorable Kathryn Sticklen, District Judge, entered August
25, 2011, which affirmed (R. 826) the Magistrate's Decision in the
Judgment and Decree of Divorce on August 10, 2010. R. 605.
Following
extensive

a

post

three
trial

day trial
briefing,

and hundreds
and

after

of

Exhibits

receiving

and

proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from each party, the lower
court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on July 26,
2010.

R. 561.

Bill Clark moved the Trial Court to alter or amend

its Decision but the Magistrate did not change the result (R. 679)
and Appellant appealed to the District Court from the Order Re:
Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment entered on September 24, 2010. R.
When

the

District

Court

considers

683.
an

appeal

from

the

magistrate Judge not involving a trial de novo, the District Court
is acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court.

State v.

Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306 (1992).
It is Respondent's position that this appeal again involves
Bill Clark's quibble with studied Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law which are well-supported in the record.
measure

still

continues

to
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ignore

the

Appellant in large

evidence

supporting

the

Court's Findings and Conclusions, the fact that Appellant failed to
trace

his

separate

particularity,

and

property
failed

to

with

reasonable

carry

his

certainty

burden

persuasion by the preponderance of the evidence.

of

proof

and
and

Reed v. Reed,137

Idaho 53, 59-60, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002). The Magistrate Court properly
applied the law,

reaching its result well wi thin the bounds of

discretion and through the exercise of reason.

Community property

principles controlled the Magistrate's findings and decision, which
were properly and carefully affirmed by the District Court as the
intermediate appellate court.

B.
Course of the Proceedings
Following trial,

the Magistrate ordered post trial briefing

and reply briefs which addressed the issues on this appeal.

The

Trial Court also ordered Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

Respondent's proposed Findings and Conclusions numbered 91

pages and Appellant's 26 pages. As a result of Appellant's Post
Trial Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, the issues were briefed and argued on September 13, 2010.
The Trial Court

denied Appellant's

Post Trial Motion regarding

Appellant's issues raised again in this appeal. Tr., pages 649-680.
Before the trial commenced,
rulings,

the

first

of

which

Defendant sought two pre-trial

was

that

since

his

real

estate

development projects were underwater, he wanted essentially all of
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the community assets.

1

The Court denied that obvious inequitable

claim and Bill did not pursue the claim at trial.

Appellant also

asked the trial court to rule as a matter of law, as regards the
first issue on appeal,

that since the balance in his retirement

account (Schwab IRA Account # ... 3713) on the day of trial was less
than it was on the day of marriage, that automatically it was all
Appellant's separate property.

The Trial Court denied the request

to ignore 10 years of history in the account, and held that such a
At trial Bill

claim depended upon what the evidence would show.

could not trace his separate property with reasonable certainty and
particularity.

Worzala v.

Worzala,128 Idaho 408,

913 P.2d 1178

(1996) .
At trial Bill sought more assets in other ways.
an unequal

division of

the net

community estate

Bill sought

but

the Court

divided the estate equally, finding that Bill's "portrayal of his
health

issues

was

somewhat

disingenuous,

given

the

level

of

activity he enjoyed, and the vigor with which he pursued it, and as
a result the Court assigned no weight to his claim of poor health
as a basis to award more property to Bill".
Conclusions of Law, p. 27.2

Findings of Fact and

R. 587.

The Court ruled in a telephone hearing with counsel on January 27,
denying both claims of the Appellant.

'4

2010,

2 Findings of Fact
found: "An issue was raised with regard to Bill's health.
In spite of a number of medical issues, which appear to be well managed by Bill, he is
extraordinarily physically fit and vigorously active for any age. He works out at the
YMCA four to five times per week, rides both mountain and road bikes three days per
week, with road rides of up to 40 miles, rides horses, hunts, hikes, snow skis, and
kayaks technically challenging and physically demanding rapids." R. 562.
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Bill pursued two additional claims at trial designed so he
could receive more community assets.

In Post Trial Briefing,

he

claimed the parties' principal residence on Stone Point deeded in
both names was his separate property.
had a

separate

property

interest

Secondly he claimed that he

in

their

Ketchum Condominium

because of the money paid to him in 2007 for work on the Veltex
Condominium project,

built after marriage from 2002-2004 was not

income but "capital gains", even though it was not clearly stated
as capital gain on the 2007 Federal Tax Return.

Exhibit 73. The

second claim failed at trial because Bill Clark could not carry his
burden

of

proof

or

persuasion,

and

overcome

the

community

presumption by tracing his separate property claim with reasonable
certainty and particularity.

Reed v. Reed,

137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d

1108 (2002); Barton v. Barton, 132 Idaho 394, 973 P.2d 746 (1999);
and Worzala v. Worzala, supra.
On

appeal

to

the

District

Court

principal residence on Stone Point was

Bill

urged

that

their

separate property.

The

District Court affirmed the Magistrate's Findings that Stone Point
was community property. Appellant has now abandoned that issue on
this Appeal. As a result, it is now the law of the case that Stone
Point is community property.
Thus, regarding the first issue on appeal, the District Court
in its appellate capacity affirmed the Magistrate Court, finding no
abuse

of discretion.

R.

832,

835.

As

to

the

second

issue

the

District Court found Bill "simply failed to meet his burden", "to
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prove

the

property was

separate

with

reasonable

certainty

and

particularity". R. 839. Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 395, 17 P.3d
889,

896

(Ct. App.

2001);

Weilmunster v.

Weilmunster,

124 Idaho

227, 234, 858 P.2d 766, 773 (Ct. App. 1993).
C.

Statement of the Facts And Corrections
to Appellant's Statement of Facts
The parties married on December 1, 2000.
child,

born

Amy

.

Emergency Room Physician and Bill is a

They have one minor
is

employed as

an

real estate development

consultant.
Appellant has some misstatements from the Record.
A.

On page 8 of Appellant's Brief,

the statement appears,

"after Bill and Dr. Baruch were married, no funds were put into the
Veltex Building,

LLC",

citing Tr. Vol.

1,

p.

418,

L.

15-19. The

cite to Vol. 1, p. 418, L.15-19 does not say that.
B.

Appellant states at pages 8 and 9 that Bill's separate

property consisted of a capital gains distribution in the Ketchum
Condominium. This is what Bill Clark testified to over objection
that there was no foundation and the court allowed his testimony
about the capital gains characterization. R. p.
421,

L.

23.

Yet,

421,

the Court did not believe his

L. 21 to p.

capital gains

characterization in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
found

that

the

distribution was
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income

and was

presumed to be

community property, since it arose during the marriage. Tr. p. 655,
L. 12 to p. 656, L. 10; Tr., p.
C.

660, L. 16 to p.

661, L.

2.

Regarding his claim of capital gains Appellant relies

heavily in this appeal on Exhibit 517A, a purported summary without
supporting documentation.
10,

and

28

of

Exhibit 517A is referred to on pages 9,

Appellant's

Brief,

but

it

The Clerk's Exhibit List at p.

evidence.

was

not

admitted

878 is wrong.

205, L. 14-18, p. 216, L. 1-4, p. 219, L.11-13.

in

Tr.,

p.

That further,

in

the transcript there is an Exhibit List that appears multiple times
at the beginning of each day's session which all show that Exhibit
517A was not admitted.
D.

Appellant,

in his brief at p.

6 and 7,

refers to the

withdrawal of monies from IRA # ... 3713 using the phrase that he did
not

"withdraw

to

himself".

The

clever

choice

of

words

is

misleading.

He did in fact withdraw the funds and funneled those

monies

his

into

investments.

R.

833.

Bill

refers

to

these

withdrawals as "rollovers" which is a way to defer the tax, but it
doesn't change the fact that it was a withdrawal of funds out of
the

IRA which

was

spent

on

his

investments

and

all

but

lost.

Pens co Trust and Sterling Trust were strawmen to avoid the tax and
penalty created by a withdrawal labeling it a rollover.
Schwab Retirement Accounts
(Issue No.1)
Amy had $74,776.85 in her Schwab IRA Account # ... 5317 on the
date of marriage.

Exhibit 32(b).
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Bill and his attorney conceded

at trial that said amount was her separate propert y 3. R. 441, item
32.

Also see Defendant's Post Trial Brief, Exhibit A, item 32. R.
Amy,

286.

alleged

on the other hand for good reason, did not concede an

separate

property

# ... 3713 on November 30,

amount

in

Bill's

2000 of $386,636.

balance of $354,350.31 on the day of trial.

Schwab

IRA Account

The account

had a

Exhibit 230.

Bill's account suffered two significant value decreases during
marriage, dropping to $249,799.82 at year end 2002, with additional
los s e s i n 2 0 0 8 ,
Exhibit 235,

p.

bot h due to rna r k e t
2324 and p. 2334.

los s e s.

T r.

p.

103,

During the marriage,

Bill removed $100,000 from his Schwab IRA # ... 3713

L.

5- 7 ;

in 2005,

(Exhibit 235,

Bates p. 2328) and deposited it into his Pensco Trust Account and
removed it and invested it in Pearson Partners, which was awarded
to Bill in the sum of $37,212. R.

593.

In 2008 Bill took another

$150,000 4 out of the Schwab IRA (Exhibit 234, p. 2334), deposited
it into his Pens co Trust Account and removed it and invested it
into the Crescent Rim Condominium Project in violation of the TRO
(Tr., p.

368, L.

18)

through the vehicle of Meyer Clark LLC, all

without permission of Amy. Findings of Fact #48-49, Tr., p. 183, L.
18-25.

The

I. R.A.

money invested in Crescent Rim was

worthless

3 As stated by the District Court, oral stipulations of the parties in the
presence of the Court are generally held to be binding, especially when acted upon or
entered in the Court records.
See: Kohringer v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d
1149, 1154 (2002).

4

Amy objected to Bill's withdrawal of $150,000.

571, L. 2 19.
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Finding of Fact #50.

Tr. p.

since Crescent Rim had a deficit of capital of $16,000,000. R. 357,
L. 5; R. 367, L. 9-18. The Trial Court found that the investments
in Crescent Rim had dubious value. Findings of Fact #73, #75, and
#83, Tr., p. 575-576.

If the only activity in Account # ... 3713 at

the date of marriage, when the balance was $386,636, were Bill's
distributions of $250,000 5 ,

and the market loss of $136,837 from

11/30/2000 to 12/31/2002,6 the IRA would have no value at all, and
therefore, Bill was not entitled to claim the value on the date of
marriage

as

his

separate

property.

The

Trial

Court

correctly

determined that the balance in the account at trial was the result
of

community

contributions

and

any

separate

property,

if

any

remaining, was hopelessly commingled.
Exhibit 235 analyzed Account 3713 since the date of marriage
and revealed significant community contributions during marriage
(Finding of Fact #45). R. 570. The Trial Court after listening to
the testimony and analyzing the evidence determined that two of the
contributions to the account in the amount of $150,000 and $15,869
were roll-overs and the Court deducted said amounts from the total
contributions of $373,182 shown on Exhibit 235, for total community
contributions of $207,313.

Footnote 1, page 11, Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order. R. 571. The evidence showed community
funds

were

commingled with

separate

funds

in

Schwab

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at R. 585-586.

# ... 3713.
While the

5 There were additional distributions including $15,869 and $75,000 in 2006,
and $28,000 in 2009. See Exhibits 235 and Defendant's Exhibit 638.
6 There were additional market losses in 2008. Ex. 235.
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value fluctuated during marriage it is unclear what percentage of
the decrease in value was a result of market conditions,
withdrawals,

and

it

was

unclear,

percentage of the withdrawals

were

as
for

the
a

court

found,

what

community or separate

purpose since Bill solely controlled the account.
Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 583 L.

versus

26-27, R.

Id; Findings of
585.

"Emblematic of Bill's course of dealing with the funds in
the Schwab 3713 account is his testimony that "[In fall
of 2008J I transferred, rolled over, $150,000 from my
3713 IRA account at Schwab to Pens co Trust, Pens co Trust
in turn invested that money in Meyer Clark, Meyer Clark
Investments, in turn, made a $150,000 loan to Crescent
Rim". This was only one of several transactions, a number
of which are described in paragraphs 45-58 above [of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of LawJ through which
Bill's movement of IRA funds, for the sole purpose of
using them for his own investments, begins to take on the
characteristics of a shell game." Id., Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. (Emphasis added).
R. 585.
Consequently, because Schwab Account # ... 3713 was commingled
and the alleged separate assets were insufficiently traced,
entire

account

was

Conclusions of Law,

community
p.

26. R.

property.
586.

Findings

of

Fact

the
and

As the District Court found,

"the Magistrate's analysis of the circumstances surrounding Bill's
I.R.A.

and the

evidence.

community's

funding of it,

are

supported by the

Memorandum Decision and Order at page 7.

R.

832.

Veltex Income and Purchase of the Ketchum Condominium
(Issue No.2)
Bill's

purported

separate

property claim

in

their

Ketchum

Condominium only arose for the first time two weeks before trial.
R.

590, L. 10-11.
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The Ketchum condominium was purchased during marriage on March
28,

Exhibit

2007.

6.

Bill attempted to orally trace

into the

purchase of the Ketchum Condominium $107,146 of a sum of $342,149
of monies he allegedly received as "income" in 2007 for work on the
Veltex Condominium project. The condominium cost $975,000.
of Fact #14.

Finding

The parties submitted checks at closing in the amount

of $205,539.23. R. 564. Amy testified that the Ketchum Condominium
was purchased in anticipation of paying down the initial loan with
proceeds of sale of McCall properties owned by the parties jointly.
Finding of Fact #13.

Tr., p. 588, L. 3 - p. 589, L. 9.

Bill testified, but yet he could not support, that the funds
he received in 2007 for his work on the Veltex building project,
started in 2002 and completed in 2004,

was anything but income.

The money received during the marriage in 2007 was presumed to be
communi ty

property

and

not

his

separate

property.

Banner

Life

Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho
117, 124, 206 P.3d 481,

488

(2009).

Amy testified that Bill was

paid for his labor. Tr. p. 588. The District Court referred to the
Record in footnote 3 as follows:
"3 Amy testified that "Veltex was--the property site was
owned by Veltex partners prior to my marriage to Bill.
The actual planning and construction of the property
occurred during the marriage. The construction occurred
from 2003 and was completed in 2004.
The sale that
generated this amount of $342,149 occurred in 2007 ... And
I believe that was due to the labor ... sweat equity that
was put in during the time of our marriage. Trial
Transcript, at 192, 588." Memorandum Decision and Order
R. 837
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The 2007 tax returns,

Exhibit 73,

did not report the money as a

capital gain on Schedule 0, nor was it identified as such on form
4797.

Bill's testimony that it was a capital gain was not believed

by the finder of fact.

Tr., pages 650-661.

Veltex, LLC was conflicting.

Bill's testimony about

Finding of Fact #16-19.

He could not

provide the date of the loan from Washington Trust Bank to build
Finding of Fact

the condominiums.

#17.

R.

565.

He avoided in

testimony the question regarding when construction was begun or
completed.
Exhibits

Finding of
241

and

Fact

243

#18.

R.

introduced

565.
by

Tr.,
Amy

construction occurred in 2002 through 2004.

p.

511 and 513.

established

that

Bill's credibility

suffered when he did not even recognize Exhibit 241 which was his
own

website,

Tr.

p.

512,

L.

3-5,

yet

Exhibit

241,

the

Clark

Development Veltex website, states that the building was completed
in 2004.
Bill received $342,149 from Veltex, LLC on February 7, 2007,
but at that time he did not personally own the land the Veltex
Building was built on, nor the building itself, rather he owned an
interest in the entities that owned the property. R. 565. Bill had
a history of being paid income to work on the projects in which he
had an interest, and reported such as income.

Tr., p. 514, L. 14 -

p. 515, L. 16.

The

funds

received

during

marriage

presumpti vely community property,
part or all of it was separate.
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in

February

2007

were

subj ect to proof by Bill that

Finding of Fact #24. R. 566.

Bill

failed in his

trace proof and that

finding

of

fact

is

second-

guessed again in this appeal.
The testimony established that the funds received from sales
of the parties' McCall properties were used to reduce the Ketchum
mortgage

significantly.

Moreover,

Tr.,

p.

588,

L.

23

to

p.

589,

L.

9.

even if Bill could have established that $107,146 came

from monies paid to him from Veltex, those funds were replaced by
$284,000 of monies of McCall proceeds in accordance with the intent
of the parties.

Exhibit 232.
III.

RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL
The Appellant failed to present any significant issue of law
on appeal.

No

findings

of

fact

made by the

arguably unsupported by substantial evidence.

trial

court were

The Supreme Court

has not been asked to establish any new legal standards or modify
existing ones.
v.

Huerta,

As such, the appeal is without foundation.

127 Idaho 17,

896 P.2d 985

(Ct.

App.

1995);

Huerta
Reed v.

Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002).
Moreover,

this

findings of fact,

appeal

is

in

essence

an

attack

upon

the

already affirmed by the intermediate appellate

court, with the District Court acting in that capacity.

Yet, Bill

has appealed again urging the same arguments but abandoning his
claim that the Stone Point principal residence was all his separate
property.
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Attorneys fees are therefore proper under Idaho Code, Section
12-121, Rule 54(e) (1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 41,
Idaho Appellate Rules.
expense to Amy,

Bill has not been dissuaded, all at great

but given the standard of review,

affirming the

District Court is a matter of procedure and attorneys fees should
be awarded to Respondent.
IV.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

Standards of Review
1.

Effect

of

District Court

Review.

The

District Court

sitting in an appellate capacity applies the standards of review
handed down by the
decision

Idaho Appellate Courts.

in Losser v.

Bradstreet,

145

Idaho

However,
670,

183

given the
P. 3d 758

(2008), the structure of the Idaho Appellate Rules now requires the
Supreme Court to directly review the District Court's decision and
consider whether the District Court committed error.

The Supreme

Court in a further appeal will then review the trial court record
to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to
support

the

Magistrate's

Findings

of

Fact,

Magistrate's Conclusions of Law follow those

and

whether

findings.

the

If the

findings are so supported and conclusions follow therefrom, and if
the District Court affirmed the Magistrate's decision,

then the

Supreme Court will likewise affirm the District Court decision as
a matter of procedure. Dunagan v. Dunagan, 147 Idaho 599, 601, 213
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P.3d.

384

(2009);

Idaho 559,

633

Losser,

P.2d 1137

Health and Welfare v.

Doe,

supra,

citing Nichols v.

(1981);

State of

145 Idaho 662,

Idaho

make

Review of Findings of Fact.

credibility

determinations

or

102

Department of

182 P.3d 1196

Harris v. Carter, 146 Idaho 22, 189 P.3d 484
2.

Blaser,

(2008);

(Ct. App. 2008).

The appellate court will not
replace

factual findings by re-weighing the evidence.

the

trial

court's

The evidence will be

viewed in favor of the Magistrate's judgement and the Appellate
Court

will

uphold

the

Magistrate's

findings

even

if

there

is

conflicting evidence. Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929, 204 p.3d 1140

(2009) (emphasis added); Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944 P.2d
695 (1997).

Findings of fact made by the trial court will not be

set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.
Idaho 689,
827),

800 P.2d 85

it is

Rohr v.

Rohr,

118

(1990). As the District Court stated

(R.

required to determine whether there

is substantial

evidence to support the Magistrate's findings of fact.

Hentges v.

Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct. App. 1988).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might

accept

to

support

a

conclusion;

scintilla, but less than a preponderance."

it

is

more

than a

Clear Springs Foods,

Inc. v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 136 Idaho 761, 764, 40 P.3d 119, 122
(2002), R. 827.
of the trial

Deference must be given to the special opportunity
court to assess

and weigh the credibility of the

witnesses who appear before it. Rohr v. Rohr, supra. On review from
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the

District Court

acting as

intermediate appellate court,

the

Supreme Court or Court of Appeals will not weigh the evidence, nor
substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial Judge.

See

Holley v. Holley, 128 Idaho 503, 915 P.2d 733 (Ct. App. 1996). When
the appellate court considers findings of fact made by the trial
court, it will review the evidence in the light most favorable to
Silva v. Silva, 142 Idaho 900,

the party who prevailed at trial.

136 P.3d 371
P.2d 921

(C.A.

2006); Pieper v.

Pieper,

1125 Idaho 667,

873

(Ct. App. 1994).

The Magistrate found that the community value of Defendant's
retirement account at Charles Schwab was based on the most credible
evidence presented.
Court agreed at p.

Finding of Fact #10.

R.

563.

The District

7, Memorandum Decision and Order. R. 832.

Where an intermediate appeal has occurred, only issues raised
in the

intermediate

appellate court.

appeal may be brought

forward

to a

higher

Harris v. Carter, 146 Idaho 22, 189 P.3d 484 (Ct.

App. 2008).
The manner and method of acquisition of property, as well as
the parties'

treatment of that property,

are questions of fact.

[The Supreme Court] defer[s] to the magistrate's findings on these
issues when they are supported by substantial evidence. Batra v.
Batra,

135

Idaho

388,

391,

17

P.3d

889,

892

(ct.

App.

2001).

However, characterization of an asset as separate or community, in
light of the facts

found,
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is

a

question of

law

over which we

exercise free

review.

Batra v.

Batra,

supra

(emphasis added),

District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, at p. 2.
Where

a

magistrate

has

set

out

to

achieve

827.

R.

equality

in

a

division of property, the division and divorce decree will not be
disturbed

on

appeal

if

it

appears

through

substantial,

albeit

conflicting, evidence that the parties have received substantially
equal shares. When there is conflicting evidence regarding property
division, it is the magistrate's task to evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence presented.

Batra,

135

Idaho

388,

398,

17

P.3d

889,

899

(Ct.

Batra v.

App.

2001),

Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, R. 828.
The

determination

of

"community"

value

is

within

the

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal
if supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Stewart v.

Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 152 P.3d 544 (2007); Chandler v. Chandler,
136 Idaho 246, 32 P.3d 140 (2001).

3.

Trial Court Discretion. The discretionary decisions of

the trial court will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial
court

abused

its

discretion.

A Trial

Court's

disposition

community property is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 32 P.3d 140

Chandler

(2001). A review for abuse

of discretion means:
" ... (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 16

of

consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the
trial court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 902, 950 P.2d
1237, 1241 (1997); Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 817
P.2d 160 (1991); Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87 (1991).
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "individual cases will
have to be largely decided on their facts" and that "it is better
policy to allow the trial court sufficient discretion to consider
the circumstances

in each case to determine the most equitable

manner for determining and dividing the marital portion of pension
benefits".

District

citing Maslen

v.

Court's

Maslen,

Memorandum

and

Decision,

Idaho

91,

822

P.2d

982,

998

Court

and

Court

of

121

85,

R.

835,

(1991) .
4.

Conclusions

of

Law.

The

Supreme

Appeals will review freely conclusions of law reached, by stating
legal rules or principles and applying them to facts found. State
v.

Miller,

134 Idaho 458,

462,

4 P.3d 570,

574

(Ct. App.

2000);

Liebelt v. Liebelt, 118 Idaho 845, 801 p.2d 52 (Ct. App. 1990). If
the

law has

been properly applied

to

the

facts

as

found,

the

judgment will be upheld on appeal. Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 131
Idaho 731, 963 P.2d 1168 (1998).
In this case,

given the preponderance of the evidence,

and burden of proof and persuasion, the Trial Court's findings were
supported by substantial evidence and the Trial Court did not abuse
its discretion.

The District Court, after careful review, agreed.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 17

Additionally, the trial court found Amy's testimony credible, but
the same cannot be said for Bill Clark, whose credibility problems
plagued

him

throughout

Findings of Fact #16,
R.

the

trial.

#18, #29,

Examples

#50,

can

be

found

in

#54, and #96; R. 585, L. 24;

587, L. 20-24.
It

is

unfortunate

that

Appellant

fails

to

cite

to

Exhibits and the Record which supports the Trial Court's findings
of fact, so that the Court can determine how it is the Trial Court
made and supported its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

instead of just re-stating his version of the facts again.7

B.
The District Court Did Not Error In Affirming The
Magistrate's Finding That The Value Of Appellant's
Charles Schwab SEP!IRA # .. . 3713 Was Community Property
Appellant's

claim

concerning

his

SEP!IRA

was

deceptively

simple and inherently unfair. He claimed that since the value on
the date of marriage of $386,636 exceeded the balance at the date
of divorce of $353,873, that all of the account was his sole and
separate property. That view ignores the fact that the account in
2002

because

of

market

fluctuations

dropped

down

to

$249,799

(Exhibit 235) and dropped again thereafter; that Bill removed funds
in excess of $250,000 from the account during marriage

(Exhibits

7 For example, Appellant states as "fact" in the course of proceedings Section
of his brief, at page 5, that the magistrate found that the distribution Bill received
was a "capital gain", which he attempted to trace into purchase of the Ketchum Condo.,
but the Court found it was not a capital gain, but income. District Court Memorandum
Decision and Order at p. 13. R. 838.
The Trial Court did not believe Bill's
testimony that it was capital gain. Tr. p. 655, L. 12 to p. 656, L. 10; Tr., p. 660,
L. 16 to p. 661, L. 2.
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235

and

638);

and

that

community

contributions

in

the

$207,313 were added to the account during the marriage.

sum of
(Exhibit

235, Footnote 1, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 571.
Account
found.

8

# ... 3713

became

hopelessly

commingled

as

the

Court

so

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 23-26 cited by

the District Court at p. 5-6 of the Memorandum Decision and Order.
R. 830-831.
Appellant cited Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 822 P.2d 982
(1991)

to the Magistrate and District Court for the proposition

that the Court should simply subtract the value on the date of
marriage from the value at divorce to arrive at the community value
today.

The

simplistic

Supreme

view

would

Court
not

in

Maslen

always

recognized

apply

and

in

that

such

affirming

a

the

Magistrate here the District Court quoted the most applicable part
of Maslen:
"Because the provisions of retirement plans vary so
greatly from plan to plan, both in the manner of funding
and also in the administration of the plans, and because
the circumstances in each case are so varied we decline
to state a single inflexible rule for calculating the
communi ty interest or value of retirement plans .... it
appears to us to be impractical-if not impossible-to
formulate a categorical rule about the appropriate
treatment of retirement accounts in dissolution of
marriage cases. We conclude that it is a better policy to
allow the trial court sufficient discretion to consider
the circumstances in each case to determine the most

8 During marriage Bill transferred out $250,000 to Pens co Trust and Sterling
Trust which lost nearly all of its value.
Exhibit 74A, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law 46 and 48. R. 570-571. Amy objected to a $150,000 withdrawal in
2008 but Bill did it anyway. Finding of Fact #50. R. 571.
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equitable manner for determining and dividing the marital
portion of pension benefits." Maslen v. Maslen, supra,
District Court Memorandum Decision and order at p. 7, R.
832.
The District Court in affirming the Magistrate explained as
follows:
"The
circumstances
of
this
case,
concerning
the
utilization of the couple's IRAs, are also different than
those in McCoy v. McCoy, in which no withdrawals were
made from the IRA accounts. The magistrate's analysis of
the circumstances
surrounding Bill's
IRA and the
community's funding of it, are supported by the evidence.
As noted by the magistrate, while Bill initially had a
balance of $386,636.18, the community provided some
$200,000 of contributions to it during the marriage,
while Bill was making withdrawals from the account to
finance his business ventures.
Due to the lack of
accounting, it cannot be determined to what extent the
reduction in value in the account was due to market
forces or the withdrawals. In any event, the magistrate
did not abuse his discretion in determining that the most
equitable solution was to divide Bill's IRA equally,
since his IRA, which began as consisting of only his
separate
property,
was
commingled
with
community
property." R. 832-833.

The simple subtraction method was appropriate to one plan in Maslen
in part because the plan increased in value during marriage,

in

that United Airlines (Mr. Maslen's employer) contributed 9% of his
monthly

salary

to
the

the

retirement

growth

in his

account.

asserting

that

property,

rather he was asking the court

calculation to the entire plan.

Mr.

retirement

Maslen

plan was

to apply a

was

not

separate
time rule

Appellant cites here and to the

District Court the case of McCoy v. McCoy, 125 Idaho 199, 868 P.2d
527 (Ct. App. 1994) which utilized the subtraction method. Like Mr.
Maslen's retirement plan, Judy McCoy's IRA's and 401(k) grew during
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the

marriage

property.

and

McCoy,

the

increase

supra,

at

was

205.

decreased during the marriage.

determined
Here,

Bill

to

be

community

Clark's

SEP/IRA

The Court in McCoy also stated "no

evidence was presented to show that Judy or Clinton withdrew any
funds from the retirement account during the marriage .. .
at 205.

Supra,

If.

Yet here, during the marriage Bill Clark took withdrawals

and moved the monies from Schwab # ... 3713 in the sum of $301,975

(Exhibit 235) "to finance his business ventures". R. 832. Bill then
as ked the Trial Court to confirm the entire account balance of
$353,873 as his separate property and the Court could not legally
ignore said distributions as well as the contributions during the
marriage in the amount of $207,313.
When

separate

property

and

community

amounts

exist

in

an

account, commingling will convert the separate property portion to
community property unless the separate property can be identified
and properly traced.

Barton v. Barton, 132 Idaho 394, 973 P.2d 746

(1999); Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 17 P.3d 889 (Ct. App. 2001).
Appellant's tracing of the separate property component must be
established wi th "reasonable certainty and particulari ty".

Worzala

v. Worzala, 128 Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (1996); Houska v. Houska,
95 Idaho 568,
proof.

512 P.2d 1317

Before the trial,

(1973).

Bill failed to provide such

the parties asked the Court to address

pre-trial Mr. Clark's attempt to compare the balance today to the
balance

on the

date

whether

factually

and

of marriage
legally the
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and

if

court

the

amount

would

be

were

less,

compelled to

conclude that it was all separate property. On January 27,

2010,

prior to trial, the court properly ruled that it would come down to
a matter of proof. Yet, at trial Appellant did not even attempt to
trace, either directly or indirectly, with reasonable certainty and
particularity.

Josephson v.

1236

1989).

(Ct. App.

Josephson,

115 Idaho 1142,

772 P.2d

Such trace was impossible due to lack of

accounting evidence from Bill. R. 832. Because Bill Clark did not
trace with reasonable certainty and particularity the $386,636 in
existence one day before marriage to the stock, bonds, and cash in
the account now, he failed to rebut the community presumption. In
addition he did not attempt to identify community contributions,
additions, interest, dividends, and natural enhancement on the same
as part of a trace. During the marriage funds were added and funds
moved in and out of the account and what was there at trial was
clearly not what was there on the date of marriage.

A review of

Bill Clark's SEP/IRA shows that it dropped in value from $386,636
on November 30, 2000
(Exhibit 235).

(Exhibit 235) to $249,799 at the end of 2002

The account suffered an additional drop in value

because of the market correction in 2008. Apart from additions and
withdrawals which Appellant ignored, in essence Bill Clark sought
to make the community a guarantor and pay him back for the drop in
value by a windfall award at trial of the value he had on the date
of marriage, while his removal of funds to invest in his projects
were

all

but

lost

in

their
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entirety.

The

value

consisted

of

investments

made

from

additions

and

interest ,

appreciation and minus market loss on the same,

dividends,

plus

all of which was

community property during the marriage. Mr. Clark did not attempt
to trace because he could not trace with reasonable certainty and
particularity in commingled account # ... 3713.
The Trial

Court

found and the

District Court affirmed the

following:
"There is no question, based on the significant community
contributions thereto, that the community has an interest
in the Schwab 3713 account.
From the date of marriage,
and every year thereafter, the community invested into
the account in varying amounts, totaling over $200,000.
There was no evidence to suggest a finding other than
that Bill had sole control over the withdrawal of money
from the IRA [and that] ... significant community funds
were commingled with separate funds".
Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. R. 583, 585, 586.
The

Magistrate

Appellant's

and

argument

District

below

Court

that

the

addressed

and

characterization

distribution of the IRA was controlled by Maslen v.
Idaho 85,

822 P.2d 982

868 P.2d 527

(1991)

rejected

and McCoy v. McCoy,

Maslen,

and
121

125 Idaho 199,

(Ct. App. 1994). Neither case controlled because the

IRA was a savings account and the time rule does not apply to a
savings

account.

It

was

clear

that

"Bill's

treatment

of

the

account during marriage is more analogous to a savings account, or
perhaps more accurately, a business capital or investment account,
than a retirement account."
Law, page 25.

R.

585.
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

"It is noteworthy that in neither Maslen or McCoy was
there evidence that withdrawals were made from the
accounts during the course of the marriage.
The
circumstances in this case are factually distinguishable
from either above cited cases, and suggest a different
analysis for determining the character and distribution
of the Schwab 3713 account."
Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
R., 585.
The

Court

found

that

significant

commingled with separate funds
and

Fact

Conclusions

of

community

in Account # ... 3713.

Law.

R.

585.

That

funds

were

Findings of
finding

was

inescapable.
Additionally,

the Trial Court found that "Bill's course of

dealing

in Schwab

3713

took on the characteristics

of a

shell

game" .

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 585. At trial

Bill was confused about his own shell game, Tr., p. 432, L. 5-15,
al though

he

objection.

knowingly
Tr.,

p.

transferred

440,

money

L.5-19 and p.

from

468,

L.

3713

over

Amy's

2-21.

There were

numerous transfers between 3713, Pensco Trust, and Sterling Trust
(Tr., p. 483, L.
investments.

Tr.,

9-18), all done to funnel funds out and into his
p.

664,

L.

4-12.

Because

of the

shell game,

Appellant had failed to provide the Court with a basis to trace any
funds within the IRA "as Bill's separate property with a reasonable
certainty and particularity".

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law. R. 585-586. Because the standard of proof is so high, and the
trace proof totally lacking or much less even attempted at trial,
the second guessing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
regarding Schwab 3713 is unreasonable in the words of Huerta v.
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Huerta,

127 Idaho 77,

896 P.2d 985

(Ct.

Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002).

App.

1995)

and Reed v.

The Appellate Court must

view the evidence in a light most favorable to Respondent since Amy
prevailed at trial on this issue.

Silva v. Silva, 142 Idaho 900,

136 P.3d 371 (Ct. App. 2006).
"Consequently, because it is commingled and
assets are insufficiently traced, the entire
amount of Schwab 3713 is deemed to be
community and will be divided equally."
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R.
586.
A tangential issue raised on appeal, and not properly an issue
for appeal to the District Court or this Court, is the claim that
the Magistrate erred in its decision that if the entirety of Bill's
IRA was community property,

then Dr.

"characterized

manner".

in

the

same

Baruch's account should be
Appellant

conceded Amy's

separate property interest of $74,777 in her IRA as a matter of
tactics,

property.

so

Bill

could argue

Schwab 3713 was

all

his

separate

Tr., p. 662, L. 16-18. Mr. Welsh said, "Judge, all I'm

saying is that we argued that both of their balances as of the date
of marriage was separate property."

Tr., p.

662,

L.

16-18.

At

the Motion to Amend, Mr. Welsh tried to argue he did not concede
her separate property portion yet he clearly did.

Tr. p., 672, L.

7-11.

for an alleged

A party may not obtain reversal on appeal

error that was invited by that party in the trial Court.

Having

conceded her separate property interest in her IRA (item 32 on the
property and debt schedule), Bill cannot appeal this issue, just
like he could not have appealed from a stipulation.
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Ratliff v.

Ratliff,

129 Idaho 422

(1996);

Smith v.

Smith,

136 Idaho 120,

29

P.3d 956 (Ct. App. 2001). Bill's counsel's concession was a matter

of tactics but was binding. Moreover, this argument was not raised
in the lower court and was only raised post trial and cannot be the
subject of an appeal.

2001).

136 Idaho 120,

123, 29

P.3d 956

(Ct.

(R.

that Amy's $74,777 in item 32 on the property and debt

270)

App.

See Smith v. Smith,

In Bill's Post Trial Brief he conceded

schedule (her Schwab Account # ... 5317) was her "separate property".
At the hearing on the Motion to Alter or Amend,
that the balance
property,

and

in Amy's

that

the

IRA before marriage was

court

should

on

decision with reference to Bill's IRA.
The

District

Court

item

27A,

but

item

32

9

and

that

Tr., p.

referred to a

quoted testimony at page 834.
to

Defendant stated
her

basis

separate

change

its

662, L.16-18.

different

I. R. A.

when it

The Trial Court was not referring
properly

separate property in Amy's Schwab IRA

treated,

(Acct.

however,

# ... 5317)

the

different

than Bill's Schwab IRA (Acct. # ... 3713) because the parties treated
them "completely different".

Tr. p. 662, L. 22 to page 663, L. 5.

Amy withdrew nothing from hers but she added to her IRA of which
Bill got the benefit. "On the other hand,
bit like his wallet

[Bill] used his a little

in terms of moving money out,

making other

9 The District Court committed a minor and harmless error
when it referred to a passage from Bill's testimony where he
conceded a Wells Fargo I.R.A. in the amount of $3,361. This is a
different IRA than Amy's Schwab IRA # ... 5317, which is the one
Mr. Welsh conceded was separate property to the extent of
$74,777.
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investments." Tr., p. 663, L. 10-12.

The $150,000 of monies Bill

withdrew from # ... 3713 in violation of the TRO,
Pensco to Crescent Rim,

was all

lost.

Tr.

p.

funneled through
367,

L.

9-18.

As

Bill's accountant testified the IRA invested in Crescent Rim is "so
far underwater to assign a value to it". Id. The $100,000 funneled
into Pearson Partners was only worth $37,212 and was assigned to
Bill. R. 593.
Appellant claims that he "never took any distributions from
his IRA", however Bill's testimony and Bill's Exhibit 638 establish
facts to the contrary:
BILL CLARK: "My recollection is that it was around
probably 1994, '95.
I transferred funds from my Schwab
IRA 3713 to Pensco Trust for an initial investment of
$30,000 -no excuse me. I'm confusing it with the one
below, Sterling Trust.
Pensco.
It would have been
it
was around 2005, and transferred $100,000 into it from my
3713 IRA for purposes of investing
having the IRA
through Pensco invest in the purchase of the land and
providing initial capital for the Pearson Partners, LLC."
Tr., p. 432, L. 5-15.
WELSH: " .. . In 2005 did you take from one IRA to another
IRA of $100,000 other than to Pensco? Was that the onlyBILL CLARK: I would have to look at the specific 3713
account. But at some point I believe it was later than
2005
we invested $100,000 into Sterling Trust Company."
Tr., p. 436, L. 24 - p. 437, L. 2.
BILL CLARK: "I transferred, rolled over, $150,000 from my
3713 IRA account at Schwab to Pens co Trust, and Pens co
Trust in turn invested that money in Meyer Clark,
$150,000, in Meyer Clark Investments.
Meyer Clark
Investments in turn made a $150,000 loan to Crescent
Rim".
Tr., p. 439, L. 7-12.
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Defendant's Exhibit 638 shows the following amounts in the
column "Distribution or Rollover":
$100,000 in 2005
$15,869 and $75,000 in 2006,
$1,495 in 2007,
$150,000 in 2008 (without counting the $150,000
that came out twice but went back in twice), and
$150,000, $28,000 and $6,611 in 2009.
Bill Clark was very confused about all such transfers and
lacked believability, as the following passage at Tr., p. 448, L.
7-21 shows:
WELSH: How was your investment in Sterling created?
BILL CLARK: It was through a transfer of funds from my
3713 IRA account to Sterling investments who in turn-the original investment was $ 30,000, I believe. And it
was made--in turn made the investment in Alpha Lending,
LLC, which is a Boise-based real estate lending company.
I realize, as I was looking at this, I have to correct a
statement I made a little bit ago.
I got confused. I
said a little bit ago that I had transferred $150,000
from my 3713 IRA to Pensco for purposes of the Meyer
Clark investment.
What I actually did was invest-transferred $ 50,000 to--excuse me. I take all that back."
Tr., p. 448, L. 7-21.
On appeal to the District Court, Appellant sought to distinguish
between the word "rollover" and the word "distribution".
this

appeal,

regardless

of

semantics,

the

above

Now on

monies

were

deducted and came out of account from the balance of Schwab IRA
# ... 3713,

which account was used like a shell game.

R.

585.

District Court soundly rejected the semantics game.
"The defendant contends that the magistrate's conclusion
that Bill withdrew funds during the marriage from the IRA
is not supported by the evidence.
All of the evidence
presented
established
that
Bill
never
took
any
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The

distributions from his IRAs.
The evidence presented
showed that he rolled over funds and transferred funds
amongst the three retirement accounts only". Appellant's
Brief, at 13-14. This assertion is simply not accurate.
For example, Bill testified during the trial that he used
$150,000 from this IRA to provide additional funding for
his Crescent Rim condominium project.
Seer e.g' r Trial
Transcript, at 439-40 ("I transferred, rolled over,
$150,000 from my 3713 IRA account at Schwab to Pens co
Trust, and my Pensco Trust in turn invested that money in
Meyer Clark, $150,000 in Meyer Clark Investments, Meyer
Clark Investments in turn made a $150,000 loan to
Crescent Rim ... And then I decided to use funds from the
IRA, my 3713 IRA, as I just described. That's how it got
to Meyer Clark into Crescent Rim.") See also id. r at 473
("So there was a transfer from the 3713 IRA account to
Pens co . And Pens co then put those funds into Pearson
Partners for purposes of buying down the loan.") Al though
technically the transfers were not made directly to Bill,
the magistrate was correct in finding that they were
effectively just that." R. 833.
It appears bold, greedy and litigious that Bill would still
seek on this appeal to have all of his IRA treated as separate
property, when the funds were withdrawn and virtually all lost in
Bill's failed business ventures,
too!

and seek one-half of Amy's IRA

Such an approach is consistent and why Bill Clark suffered

from his inequitable positions.
The Court correctly perceived that its division of community
property was a discretionary determination.

Tr. p. 677, L. 11-14;

Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 32 P.3d 140 (2001); Stewart v.
Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 152 P.3d 544

(2007)

In terms of Maslen,

supra, that Supreme Court realized contrary to Appellant's view of
Maslen, that one treatment of retirement accounts was not logical
for all cases.

There are different ways in treating retirement

accounts based on the circumstances that exist
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(Tr. p.

677, L. 19

to page

678,

L.

1)

and that is why the Court exercised proper

discretion when it stated:
"Applying the analysis approved in Maslen and McCoy,
would result in ignoring the entirety of the community's
contributions to the account and produce a result that is
unfair
to
the
community. "
Findings
of
Fact
and
Conclusions of Law. R. 586.
In fact the message of Maslen is what Judge Reardon and the
District Court thought it to be:
"Because the provisions of retirement plans vary so
greatly from plan to plan, both in the manner of funding
and also in the administration of the plans, and because
the circumstances in each case are so varied we decline
to state a single inflexible rule for calculating the
community interest or value of retirement plans."
"Because there are so many variables, individual cases
will have to be largely decided on their facts.
We
conclude that it is a better policy to allow the trial
court sufficient discretion to consider the circumstances
in each case to determine the most equitable manner for
determining
and
dividing
the
marital
portion
of
retirement benefits. Maslen v. Maslen, 121 Idaho 85, 91,
822 P.2d 982 (1991).
On page 13 of Appellant's Brief,

he ignores the

foregoing

statement of the law and urges here a "one size fits all" approach
to both IRAs in this case, which the lower court and the District
Court wisely rejected.
The court acted well within the outer bounds of discretion and
reached its result through reason.

Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho

494, 817 p.2d 160 (1991); Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 32
P.3d 140 (2001).
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The

best

example

of

proper

discretion

in

action

is

the

following passage from the hearing on Appellant's Motion to Alter
or Amend:
"We have different ways of treating retirement accounts
based upon the circumstances that exist. And my findings
were based upon my belief that the circumstances with
which Mr. Clark treated his retirement account during the
course of the marriage were significantly different than
the way Dr. Baruch treated her retirement account during
the course of the marriage. And it was those differences
that made up the basis for my finding that the
distribution should be as I set forth. And I can't think
of a reason, based on what we have talked about here
today, to change that. So I'll deny the motion to alter
or amend with respect to that point."
Tr., p. 677, L.
24 through p. 678, L. 12.
C.

The District Court Did Not Error In Affirming The
Magistrate's Finding That Bill Received Income That Was
Community Property And That Appellant
Failed to Trace Separate Property Into the Ketchum Condominium
The value, debt and allocation of the Ketchum condominium was
stipulated to by the parties.

The condominium cost $975,000.

R.

564. The parties agreed that at the time of trial the condominium
was valued at $725,000, with liens in the amount of $372,788.
was agreed that
$352,211.

Amy would

keep the

It

condominium with equity of

At trial, Bill sought reimbursement for separate funds

he alleged were expended in acquiring the condominium.
Fact #11. R. 564.

10

Finding of

Bill testified that the separate funds invested

10
Although not before this Court, the dollar for dollar separate property
reimbursement rule of Os tick v. Ostick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1983)
appears inequitable when the property declined in value by $250,000. Why should the
separate property receive such a guaranty when a community reimbursement claim is not
treated that way? The community reimbursement rule in Martsch v. Martsch, 103 Idaho
142, 645 P.2d 882 (1982) is more logical and fair.
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in

the

Ve 1 tex

Ketchum Condominium were proceeds

from

Building,

on

which

funds

he

received

the

sale

February

of the

7,

2007,

subsequent to the sale of his interest in that development.
the

Court

did

testified

not

that

accept

the

that

Ketchum

testimony,

in

Condominium

part

was

Yet

because Amy

purchased

In

anticipation of paying down the initial loan with proceeds of the
sale of the McCall properties which the parties owned jointly, and
from

which

she

should

have

been

reimbursed

for

property contribution in acquiring a McCall Cabin.
#13. R. 564.

her

separate

Finding of Fact

Tr., p. 193, L. 2-21; Tr. p. 588, L. 3-13. Bill and

Amy purchased the Ketchum Condominium March 28, 2007, for $975,000.
At closing, the parties submitted checks in the amounts of $30,000
and $175,539.23 as a down payment.

Tr. p. 190, L. 24 - p. 191, L.

13; Exhibits 6 and 232.
Bill was engaged in development business through the auspices
of

variously named business

Vel tex Building,

LLC,

formed

entities.

Two

to acquire

such entities

the

site on which

were
the

Veltex Building would be built, and BED Investments, LLC, formed to
engage in the development and building of the Veltex building, a
residential and office condominium complex.
R. 564.

Finding of Fact #15.

However, Bill provided conflicting evidence and testimony

regarding the

timing of his

Investments and Veltex LLC.

acquisition of
At trial,

an

interest

in BED

Bill's testimony was that

BED Investments was a partner in Veltex at its inception, and that
he acquired an interest in BED Investments
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at the same time it

acquired an interest in Veltex. R. 565, L. 1-9. Bill also testified
that these two events occurred in 1997. R. 565, L.6.

Exhibit 517

establishes that Veltex LLC was not established until October 29,
1998,

and Exhibit

517

establishes

that

BED Investments was

formed until January 22, 1999. Finding of Fact #16.

R.

not

565.

Bill testified that the construction of the Veltex building
was financed through a loan from Washington Trust Bank to Veltex
LLC, but did not provide a date on which the loan was procured.
Finding of Fact #17; R., 565, Tr., p. 412, L. 7-25.
provide proof who signed the loan.

Nor did Bill

Bill also testified that the

planning for the Veltex building was done prior to marriage, but
avoided

the

question

regarding

when

construction

was

begun

or

completed. Finding of Fact #18. R. 565. On cross examination after
shown Exhibit 241, Bill conceded construction began in the fall of
2002.

Tr.,

p.

512,

L.

23 to p.

513,

L.

11.

Bill first

received

$260,800, paid by BED Investments in October 2005 and deposited by
Bill into Schwab # ... 3714,

a community account.

was dissolved in April 2008.

Exhibit 516.

BED Investments

The next payment to

Bill about which there was evidence, was in the amount of $342,149
paid by Veltex LLC, and deposited by Bill into the Schwab # ... 3714
community account

on

February

7th,

2007.

Yet,

at

the

time

of

marriage, and at the time he received the distributions referred to
above, Bill personally owned neither the land the Veltex building
was built on, nor the building itself, rather owned an interest in
the entities which owned the property.
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Findings of Fact,

#21-22.

R.

565.

either

Bill did not relinquish any percentage of his shares in
BED

Investments

or

since

LLC

in

exchange

for

the

Finding of Fact #23. R. 566.

distributions he received.
Accordingly,

Veltex

both

sums

were

received

by

Bill

marriage they were presumed to be community property,

during

subject to

proof by Bill that part or all of the funds received were separate.
Banner Life Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust,
147 Idaho 117, 124, 206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009). Finding of Fact #24.
While Bill testified that "all the planning" on the Veltex building
project was done prior to marriage,

the Court properly found it

more likely than not, given the fact that ground was not broken on
the project until sometime after September of 2002
and

not

completed

until

2004

(Exhibit

241),

(Exhibit 243)

that

significant

community effort was expended on the project by Bill.

Finding of

Fact #25. R. 566; Exhibit 241.
At the hearing to alter or amend, the Court explained again to
Appellant's counsel what the Court found to be true:
"Well, my perspective on it was that based
upon the timing, Mr. Clark had his share in
Veltex at the time they were married, and at
the time that he received this, what you
characterized as capital gains and I'm viewing
it as income, was about seven years after the
marriage." Tr. p. 655, L. 12 17.
In Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend, Bill's counsel could not
convince the trial court that the monies he received for developing
the Vel tex proj ect were
Bill had failed

to

something other

carry his
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burden to

than community income.
overcome

the

community

presumption,

since the funds were received during the marriage.

Banner Life Insurance Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust,
supra; Reed v. Reed, supra; Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d
411

(1983). Bill failed to trace his so-called separate proceeds

with reasonable certainty and particularity.

Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, p. 22.
The Court ruled:
" ... my finding was based upon my determination that it
was more probable than not that Mr. Clark put a
significant amount of effort into this project in the
planning, building and selling of units after they were
married. And that the compensation that was received in
2007 that has been characterized as capital gains was
income because he didn't give anything up in exchange for
that." Tr. p. 655, L. 24, through p. 656, L. 7.
The Court was well aware of Mr. Clark's credibility problem on
this issue as well.

Bill testified under oath that all planning on

the Veltex building occurred before marriage,

(Tr., p. 413, L. 4-6)

but given the fact that ground was not broken until September 2002
(Tr., p. 513, L.

9-11; Exhibit 243), and not completed until 2004

(Tr., p. 573, L. 22-24), his testimony was not believable and the
Court so concluded. Finding of Fact #25 (R. 566); Exhibit 241.

Amy

testified that the Veltex Building was planned and developed during
the marriage,

"and the proceeds that he

lists there,

$ 342,149,

occurred during the time of marriage, and I believe that was due to
the labor ... the sweat equity that was put in during the time of our
marriage".

Tr. p. 588, L. 7-22.
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Bill received income in 2007 for work on the Veltex project.
Tr. p. 660, L. 3-10.

The Court properly concluded:

"I think based on the evidence that I heard, that it is
more likely than not that the gain that they realized in
2007 was a result of community effort, and it's income."
Tr., p. 660, L. 3-7.
That further,

the Court stated:

"I mean, my view of the evidence was that, taken as a
whole the evidence about when Vel tex and Mr. Clark's
confusion about when he formed BED Investments and when
he formed Veltex, and his testimony about when the
developments started and more credible proof that I
received about when it actually started, all of that for
me added up to a finding it was more likely than not that
all the effort was put into the Ve1tex building that
resulted in income being distributed seven years later
was income."
Tr., p. 660, L17, through p. 661, L. 2.
Exhibits 241 and 243.
A more classic example of the proper weighing of evidence, applying
the preponderance of evidence standard, assessing credibility, and
exercising reason well within the bounds of discretion would be
hard to find.

Stewart v.

Stewart,

(2007); Chandler v. Chandler,

143 Idaho 673,152 P.3d 544

136 Idaho 246,

32 P.3d 140

(2001).

The Appellate Court must decline Appellant's invitation to second
guess the

fact

finder.

The Supreme Court does not re-weigh the

evidence nor does it substitute its view of the facts for that of
the

trial

record.

judge,

Holley v.

even

if there

Holley,

is

conflicting evidence

128 Idaho 503,

509,

in the

915 P.2d 733

(Ct.

App. 1996.
Appellant's attempt to trace said funds into the purchase of
the

Ketchum Condominium also
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failed

at

the

starting point

and

Appellant was not entitled to a reimbursement claim in the Ketchum
Condominium. Appellant concedes that the balance in Schwab Account
Number # . .. 3714 of $195,024.51 on February 9,
(Appellant's

property.

Brief

to

the

2007 was community

District

Appellant's Brief to the Supreme Court, p. 27).

Court,

R.

729;

Appellant conceded

that the down payment of $30,000 came from a community property
source.

(Appellant's Brief,

729).

R.

Thereafter,

the deposit of

Veltex income received during the marriage in the sum of $342,149
was also community property and was presumed as such. Reed v. Reed,
137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002); Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673
P.2d 411

(1983).

As the parties testified and which was further

supported by Exhibits,

ground was broken on the Veltex Building

sometime after September 16,
the

parties

industry

were

and

married,

on

the

finished in 2004.
developed

and

2002,

approximately 22 months after

and developed with Bill's

community

Veltex

clock.

community

construction

was

(Exhibit 241). The Veltex Building was planned,
during

constructed

the

marriage

which

was

corroborated through impeachment of Bill's testimony. Tr. p. 588,
L. 19-22. Appellant did not meet his burden of proof and persuasion

because

he

did

not

trace

with

reasonable

certainty

and

particularity that any of his alleged separate funds comprised the

$205,539 ($30,000+$175,539, Exhibit 232, Bates page 2374) paid by
the parties at the closing to purchase the Ketchum Condominium.
Bill Clark failed

to

trace

his

alleged

"reasonable certainty and particularityu.
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separate

property with

Worzala v. Worzala, 128

Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (1996); Houska v. Houska,
512

P.2d

1317

(1973)

Plaintiff's

Exhibit 232 outlined the

Exhibit

flow of monies

# ... 3714, Bill's working capital account.

232

95 Idaho 568,

was

persuasive.

in and out of Account
The Ketchum down payment

of $205,539 was replenished from part of the proceeds from the sale
of McCall properties totaling $684,211 on 5/17/2007 and 9/11 2007.
Meanwhile Bill had paid out $333,391 of funds from # ... 3714 from
2/9/07

through

12/5/2007

unrelated

to

the

Ketchum

Condo.

It

appears that Bill would have difficulty running his business as
usual

if

significant

# ... 3714.

funds

Exhibit 232.

had

not

been

returned

to

Account

In short, the supposed Veltex proceeds had

been replenished to Bill's account.
On

appeal,

ini tially

Appellant

concluded

as

set

stated
forth

that
in

the

the

"Magistrate

Findings

of

Court

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law, "that capital gains earned on separate property
is income".

(Appellant's Brief, p. 19). The Court actually stated,

"this presumption appears to be based on his belief that capital
gains from a separate asset during marriage are separate property,
a

proposition that the court can find no

support.

R.

582.

The

statement was harmless error and the District Court recognized that
the Magistrate corrected the statement at the post trial hearing,
namely, "that capital gains from a separate asset received during
marriage are not always separate property".
appears

to

have

created

the

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 38

problem

in

R.

part

838.
with

Appellant
an

improper

The rule that applies is

"capital gain" label--a tax concept.ll

about natural appreciation as stated by the District Court:
"As a general rule, the natural enhancement in value of
separate property during coverture [marriage] does not
constitute community property; however, to the extent an
enhancement in value is due to the community efforts,
labor, industry of funds, it falls into the community".
Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 127, 525 P.2d 314, 322
(1974) .
Similarly, proceeds from the sale of a separate asset can be
part separate, part community.
can

arise,

which

if

not

Within proceeds a commingling issue

traced

with

reasonable

particularity will all become community.

certainty

and

Worzala v. Worzala, 128

Idaho 408, 913 P.2d 1178 (1996); Desfosses v. Desfosses, 122 Idaho
634,

836 P.2d 1095

(Ct. App.

1992).

Income derived from Bill's

labor and industry during the marriage is community.
including rents,
community,

is

issues and profits of all property,

community

property .. .

ff.

Idaho

Code,

"The income,
separate or
Section

32-

906(1). Finally, since the $342,179 of income was received during
the marriage

in

2007

it

is

presumed to be

community property.

Banner Life Insurance Company v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable
Trust, supra. This was a proper fact finding issue for the trial
court and the court's finding is supported by substantial evidence.
The Magistrate's initial statement at R.

582 about capital

gains did not effect the logic and appropriateness of the court's
conclusion.

The bottom line finding and conclusion was:

11 The term capital gains is a confusing term. Proceeds from the sale of an
asset can have separate and community components. Community labor could have caused
the proceeds and distribution may have commingling issues.
But here, the money Bill
received was income, not capital gains.
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"The Veltex Building was built and developed during the
marriage and the proceeds from the Veltex Building and
income are presumed to be community property and
Defendant
[Appellant here]
failed to overcome the
community presumption. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion
regarding the purchase of the Ketchum Condominium is
Denied." Judgment and Order Re: Motion to Alter or Amend
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. R.
680-681.
The reason the Court arrived at its conclusion is that income
from separate property is community.

Idaho Code, Section 32-906.

The Court found:
"[G]iven that the funds were received during marriage,
the Court begins with the presumption that they are
communi ty property.
It then becomes Bill's burden to
trace the origin of the funds "with reasonable certainty"
to a separate source. The source in this case was Veltex
Building LLC, not the actual property itself.
Bill did
not own the property at the time of marriage, but rather
an interest in the entity that did own it.
He did not
receive the funds as a result of a liquidation of that
interest, and in fact he still owns the same percentage
of the LLC that he did at the time of marriage.
His
asset is preserved in its entirety. There is no evidence
that the asset, the LLC, increased in value naturally, or
that the funds he received were as a result of that
natural enhancement.
Given those circumstances, funds
received through the asset must be regarded as income.
Income from separate property, received during the
marriage, is community property. I.C. §32-906." R. 582.
Again, the Court found the facts based on the evidence, and despite
all of Appellant's second guessing, by way of motion to amend the
Court ruled:
"With respect to the findings that the proceeds from the
Veltex building were community property in 2007, I can't
find a reason to change that as well.
We are talking
about a period of time that was seven years post
marriage.
And my findings - I mean, we start with the
presumption that the income received is community income.
And it seems to me that I have to have something that
demonstrates clearly and convincingly that it was
separate property.
The only finding that I can make,
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based upon the evidence that I heard, was that this far
into the marriage, given the state of the project at the
time of the marriage and the amount of effort that I
found that he put into during the marriage, that there is
nothing that overcomes the presumption that its community
income.
And so I never got to a trace.
And for that
reason, I'm going to deny the motion to reconsider on
that point." Tr., p. 678, L. 13 through p. 679, L. 6.
Not only does Appellant's tracing theory fail at the starting
point,

but Appellant's

inaccurate.

Exhibit

analysis of Schwab Account

596 contains

# ... 3714 was

the Schwab statements

for the

period February and March 2007. Appellant's analysis fails to take
into account the

$1,631. 60

in community dividends

and interest

added to the Schwab account in February (Exhibit 596, pages 1283
and 1284)

and the $1,943.23 in community dividends and interest

added to the account in March (Exhibit 596, page 1294).
in

the

table

on

page

24

of

Appellant's

Brief

(R.

Further,

729),

Bill

subtracts a $10,000 check from community property "CP", allegedly
on March 26, 2007, before he accounts for the check in the amount
of $176,000 to close the purchase of Ketchum,
$10,000 check was withdrawn on March ZQ,
check cleared.

when in fact the

2007, after the $176,000

(Exhibit 596, page 1293). Bates page 1307 in Exhibit

596 shows that said $10,000 check was payable to William Clark and
was paid on March 28, 2007. Hypothetically, even if Bill had traced
the Veltex funds to proceeds of his separate property,
post trial table when corrected for dividends,
$10,000

chronological

error,

would

reflect

interest,
that

then his
and the

there

was

$82,428.76 remaining from the community property February balance
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in the Schwab account before the $176,000 check cleared. However,
correcting Appellant's math in his
academic

since

deposit,

as the Court properly concluded.

the

alleged

the

trace

$342,149

Post Trial Brief was purely

the

"income"

Court

was

properly

a

community

Finally,

considered

property

in addressing
the

parties'

intent.
It

was

not

the

parties'

intent

to

use

Vel tex

monies

to

purchase the Ketchum Condominium and Appellant only attempted such
a trace belatedly in this case by ignoring the parties intent after
applying too narrow of a time period to a purported last minute and
undeveloped indirect trace under Josephson v. Josephson, 115 Idaho
1142,

772

P.2d

1236

(Ct.

App.

1989).

Amy

testified

that

the

Ketchum Condo was purchased knowing that they were going to use the
proceeds from the sale of their McCall lots and their McCall Cabin
to

buy

the

Ketchum

Condominium.

Tr.,

p.

588,

L.

7-13.

The

appropriate trace time period should extend to September 11, 2007.
The proceeds from the sale of the McCall Lots were $452,528 and the
proceeds from the sale of the McCall Cabin were $231,683. Exhibit
232, pages 2384 and 2385.

The combined McCall proceeds of $684,211

($452,528+231,683) were more than sufficient to fund the $205,539
used

to

$400,000

purchase
paid

Ketchum

in October

(Exhibit 232, page 2380).

($30,000
2007

to

+

$175,539)

reduce

the

as

well

as

the

Ketchum mortgage.

The proceeds from the sale of the McCall

properties more than replenished Account # ... 3714, Bill's working
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capital commingled account,
Ketchum.

Tr.,

p.

588,

L.

for the money temporarily removed for
3 through p.

589,

L.

9;

Exhibit 232.

When applying a trace under Josephson, supra, care must be taken to
include the parties'
community monies

intent in determining the overall effect of

in both assets,

Condominium and to

use

the

the

3714

correct time

account

span

for

and Ketchum
the

indirect

trace.
The Court properly stated and found:
"Even apart from the above analysis, the Court cannot
find that Bill traced the funds used for the Ketchum
condominium down payment to a separate source. Bill had
no other livelihood or source of income than that of a
real estate developer. Accepting his testimony that the
site for the Veltex building was acquired at the same
time BED investments was formed, the LLC's didn't own the
site until January of 1999, slightly less than two years
prior to marriage.
Given that construction wasn't
completed until more than three years after marriage, and
that there was no evidence of what, if any, income was
earned by either BED investments or Veltex Building LLC,
prior to marriage, Bill has not met his burden of tracing
either the 2005 distribution, or the 2007 distribution,
with reasonable certainty.
Therefore, the funds drawn from Schwab 3714 to use as
a down payment on the Ketchum condominium are community
funds,
and Bill is not entitled to reimbursement
separately for any part of the amount." Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.
R. 583.
Appellant

conflates

the Magistrates

Decision to

serve

argument on appeal that the Judge misunderstood the issue.

his
The

bottom line for the Court is that based on this record and the
evidence before

it,

what

Bill

received

presumed to be community property.

in

2007

was

income and

Bill could not carry his burden

even by mislabeling the issue as "capital gains", because he failed
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to trace with reasonable certainty and particularity that what he
received was his separate property rather than compensation for his
labor.

The District Court properly rejected a second guessing of

the fact finder attempted here again.
The case of Wolford v. Wolford,
(1990)

dealing with whether there

117 Idaho 61,785 P.2d 625

is

an undistributed dividend

which may actually be undistributed wage income, in a corporation,
entitling the community to reach it, is not involved in this case,
and is

an

irrelevant

misdirect.

Again,

what

Bill

received was

income. 12
The community reimbursement rules are not involved in this
case but rather the failure of Bill to identify and trace community
income used to purchase the Ketchum Condominium.
Nei ther
Sherry,

are

the

community

108 Idaho 645,

enhancement

701 P.2d 265

Swope, 122 Idaho 296, 834 P.2d 298

rules

(Ct. App.

1985)

of

Sherry v.

or Swope v.

(1992) applicable here.

While

Appellant may like to recharacterize the issue, Bill's problem is
not found in those cases,
overcome

the

community

but rather is found in his failure to

presumption

of

the

income

he

received,

coupled with his lack of credibility.

12 Speer v.
Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 128, 525 P.3d 314, 323
(1974) adds credence to the Trial Court's finding that what Bill
received was compensation for his labor, but is not applicable to
an inquiry of retained earnings in this case, because Bill
actually received income, and Amy wasn't chasing retained
earnings because Bill may not have been properly compensated.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 44

V.
CONCLUSION
The Decision of the District Court must be upheld on appeal.
Findings

of

substantial
discretion,

Fact were not clearly erroneous,
evidence

and

the

Magistrate

were

did

as the District Court so concluded.

supported by

not

abuse

his

Attorneys fees

should be awarded to Respondent.
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